The NSW Government is moving to expand police powers to compel access to mobile phones and other digital devices that have been lawfully seized during organised-crime investigations.
The proposal has prompted concerns about privacy because NSW Police can use powerful digital-forensics tools capable of extracting large amounts of information from supported devices.
Among the technology reportedly used by Australian law-enforcement agencies are products developed by Cellebrite, an Israeli-founded digital-forensics company.
The Israeli connection is therefore real—but it is important to describe it accurately.
There is evidence that NSW Police use technology supplied by an Israeli company. There is no publicly established evidence that the Israeli government demanded the proposed legislation, controls NSW policing policy or automatically receives data extracted from phones.
What is the NSW Government proposing?
On 18 June 2026, the Minns government announced proposed changes involving Digital Evidence Access Orders.
These orders can require a person to provide information or assistance needed to access data held on a digital device, including a password, PIN or other unlocking information.
Under the proposed reform, police investigating suspected organised crime would be able to apply for a Digital Evidence Access Order after a device had been lawfully seized during an arrest, roadside stop or another lawful detention.
The change would remove the existing requirement for the order to be connected to an accompanying search warrant or crime-scene warrant in those circumstances.
This does not mean every frontline officer would be free to stop random members of the public and search their phones without legal authority.
The device must first be lawfully seized, and police must still apply for the relevant access order.
However, the reform would broaden the situations in which NSW Police could seek compulsory access to a seized device.
What happens if a person refuses?
Digital Evidence Access Orders already carry serious legal consequences.
NSW law contains an offence for failing to comply with an order, and people have already been charged in cases involving alleged non-compliance.
The government argues that stronger access powers are needed because organised criminal groups increasingly use encrypted devices, messaging applications and remote-wiping features to conceal evidence.
Police say valuable evidence can disappear or become inaccessible while investigators are attempting to obtain the necessary legal authority.
Where does the Israeli company come in?
Cellebrite is an Israeli-founded digital-forensics company that develops tools used by police and government agencies to access and analyse mobile devices.
Its UFED technology is designed to lawfully extract digital evidence from supported smartphones, SIM cards, memory cards, GPS devices and other equipment.
Cellebrite says its products can perform different forms of extraction, including full-file-system and physical extraction, depending on the device and circumstances.
Extracted information may include:
Messages and application data.
Photographs and videos.
Contacts and call records.
Device and account information.
Location-related records.
Browsing and search information.
Some deleted material.
The precise amount of information recovered depends on the phone model, operating system, encryption, security updates, device condition and extraction method.
It is therefore inaccurate to claim that the technology will always recover “everything a person has ever done” from every phone.
Cellebrite itself acknowledges that some extraction attempts may obtain only partial information because of password protection, settings or technical limitations.
Does Cellebrite receive the extracted information?
There is no publicly established evidence that Cellebrite automatically receives every phone extraction conducted by NSW Police.
In a typical forensic process, the tool is operated by the law-enforcement agency and the resulting data is stored and reviewed within that agency’s investigative systems.
Cellebrite supplies the extraction and analysis technology, but supplying the software does not necessarily mean the company can view every resulting file.
Questions may still arise about technical support, cloud-based services, diagnostic information, software updates and the terms of NSW Police contracts with technology providers.
Those arrangements would need to be examined before anyone could make a definitive claim about whether company personnel could access particular material under exceptional circumstances.
There is also no verified evidence that extracted NSW Police data is automatically transferred to Israel or shared with Israeli intelligence services.
Why privacy advocates are concerned
A modern mobile phone can reveal far more than traditional physical evidence.
It may contain years of private conversations, financial information, photographs, medical communications, political activity, personal relationships, location history and access to online accounts.
Even when an investigation is legitimate, accessing an entire device can expose information involving innocent relatives, friends, colleagues and professional contacts who are not suspected of any offence.
That makes safeguards particularly important.
Australians are entitled to ask:
Who authorises an extraction?
How much data may police collect?
Can irrelevant information be retained?
How long is extracted data stored?
Who can access it?
Are cloud services involved?
Can information be shared with other agencies?
What happens when no charges are laid?
The NSW Government says the reforms are directed at organised crime, not unrestricted access to the phones of ordinary residents. Nevertheless, the expansion of digital powers deserves close parliamentary and public scrutiny.
The confirmed position
The factual position is straightforward.
The Minns government is proposing broader powers allowing NSW Police to seek compulsory access to devices lawfully seized during suspected organised-crime investigations.
NSW Police can use powerful digital-forensics technology, including products associated with Israeli-founded company Cellebrite.
Those tools can extract substantial amounts of information from supported devices, although their capabilities vary and are not unlimited.
There is no verified evidence that Israel demanded the NSW legislation, that the Israeli government controls the policy or that Cellebrite automatically receives every extraction.
The legitimate public debate is not about unsupported claims of foreign control.
It is about whether expanded police access to highly personal digital information will be matched by strong warrants, independent oversight, strict retention limits and transparent safeguards.
Technology capable of exposing a person’s digital life may help police investigate serious crime—but powers of that scale must also come with accountability.