New Research Maps 110 US Military Sites
Australia’s defence relationship with the United States extends far beyond public perception, according to a comprehensive database released on 7 September 2026. Guardian Australia published findings compiled by Professor Richard Tanter of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, which map military and intelligence sites where American forces or defence corporations exercise control or operational access.
The study identifies a total of 110 facilities across the country with some form of identified American involvement. The research clarifies that these numbers count individual operations and buildings rather than just entire bases, meaning a single location can host multiple distinct US activities.
The breakdown reveals 17 facilities where the United States holds direct control while Australia retains access. Additionally, 24 sites are accessed by both the US military and American defence corporations, while 51 facilities are accessed solely by the US military. Another 18 locations are accessed exclusively by American defence corporations. The remaining 41 facilities were listed as having no significant US access, though the connection to 17 others remained unresolved at the time of publication.
Pine Gap Serves Critical Intelligence Role
Located outside Alice Springs in the Northern Territory, Pine Gap stands out as the most prominent example of this deep integration. Officially described as a joint Australian-US defence facility, it is one of the most critical intelligence installations operated by the United States outside its own territory. Its reported functions include intercepting communications, collecting signals intelligence, monitoring satellites, detecting missile launches and supplying information that can assist military targeting.
Previous reporting based on leaked United States National Security Agency documents indicated that Pine Gap’s chief is always an American who reports to the US National Reconnaissance Office. The deputy commander is an Australian Signals Directorate official. This arrangement raises a significant question regarding practical sovereignty: if the senior commander is American and the facility supports global US military operations, how much control does Canberra actually exercise over the data collected?
The intelligence produced at Pine Gap can support American operations far beyond the direct defence of Australia, including conflicts in the Middle East or surveillance across Asia. Consequently, the sovereignty debate is not merely about legal ownership but about who controls the intelligence and decides how it is used.
US Military Footprint Expands With New Bases
American involvement in Australia is no longer limited to intelligence hubs like Pine Gap. RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland can provide staging and refuelling support for US military aircraft, while RAAF Base Tindal in the Northern Territory is being expanded to better accommodate American B-52 bombers. These strategic aircraft are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons.
The United States follows a policy of neither confirming nor denying whether nuclear weapons are present on particular aircraft, ships or submarines. This ambiguity adds another layer to the discussion regarding national security and autonomy.
Furthermore, up to 2,500 US Marines rotate through northern Australia during the dry season. The government describes these deployments as temporary rotations rather than permanent foreign basing. However, when such rotations happen repeatedly, infrastructure is permanently expanded and military supplies remain positioned for future use, making the practical difference difficult to recognise.
In June 2026, Defence Minister Richard Marles announced a new US logistics facility at Bandiana near Wodonga. This announcement underscores a trend where temporary-sounding arrangements evolve into permanent strategic realities. The Albanese government insists Australia has retained its sovereignty, but critics argue the expanding American presence is making it increasingly difficult for Canberra to independently refuse Washington’s military decisions.
The distinction between ownership and access does not diminish the scale of American influence. As the number of accessible facilities climbs toward 110, the question shifts from whether America controls Australian bases to how much independent action remains possible for Australia within this framework.
This expansion complicates Australia’s ability to navigate its own foreign policy without considering the implications for American allies. The presence of nuclear-capable bombers and rotating marine forces creates a security architecture that aligns closely with Washington’s interests. For Canberra, the challenge lies in maintaining diplomatic independence while managing a military footprint that effectively covers more than half of its examined defence infrastructure.
The release of this database serves as a reminder that Australia’s defence posture is inextricably linked to US capabilities. As the number of facilities with American access grows, so too does the scrutiny on whether Canberra can truly act independently when its own military assets are integral to broader American strategic goals. The path forward requires a clear understanding of these operational realities rather than relying solely on legal definitions of sovereignty.