Israel’s ability to maintain its high level of missile defence during a prolonged confrontation with Iran is again coming under scrutiny after a former senior Israeli military commander warned that the country has fewer Arrow missile interceptors available than it would ideally want.
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Eliezer Marom, a former commander of the Israeli Navy, raised the issue during an interview with Israeli radio station 103FM.
Marom said Israel is facing an interceptor problem similar to the one confronting the United States after months of intensive missile-defence operations across the Middle East.
His comments do not mean Israel has completely run out of interceptors. Instead, they highlight concerns about the number available, the speed at which replacements can be manufactured and how sustainable current interception rates would be during a prolonged conflict.
WHAT MAROM SAID ABOUT ISRAEL’S ARROW SUPPLY
Marom specifically pointed to Israel’s Arrow missile-defence system, which is designed primarily to intercept long-range ballistic missiles.
He said Israel has fewer Arrow interceptors than it would like and described production capacity as very limited.
That distinction is important.
Modern missile-defence systems rely not only on launchers, radars and command systems but also on a continuing supply of interceptor missiles. Every successful defensive engagement can require an interceptor that must eventually be replaced.
During an extended conflict involving repeated waves of ballistic missiles, maintaining those inventories can become increasingly difficult.
Marom said this pressure has resulted in a large proportion of interceptions being conducted with assistance from American missile-defence systems.
U.S. SYSTEMS HAVE HELPED DEFEND ISRAEL
According to Marom, THAAD interceptor systems and SM-3 missiles fired from U.S. Navy ships have carried out a substantial share of interceptions.
THAAD — the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system — is designed to intercept ballistic missiles during the final stages of their flight.
The SM-3 is a ship-based interceptor used by U.S. Navy vessels equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile-defence system.
American involvement therefore provides Israel with an additional defensive layer beyond its own Arrow systems.
But that creates another problem: the United States has also been confronting concerns about the rate at which its own interceptor stockpiles are being consumed.
If both countries face pressure on available inventories simultaneously, replacing missiles quickly enough becomes increasingly important.
ISRAEL HAS ALREADY MOVED TO INCREASE PRODUCTION
Concerns about interceptor availability are not entirely new.
In April, Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced another major acceleration in production of Arrow interceptors.
The ministry said the move was intended to significantly increase both the rate of production and Israel’s interceptor stockpile.
The Arrow program is jointly developed with the United States Missile Defense Agency, while Israel Aerospace Industries plays a central role in manufacturing the system.
At the time, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz maintained that Israel had enough interceptors to protect its population, while saying increased production was necessary to ensure Israel maintained freedom of action during the continuing conflict.
That means there have been differing assessments regarding exactly how serious the inventory situation is.
Marom’s latest comments represent his assessment as a former senior military commander. Israel has not publicly released detailed current figures showing exactly how many Arrow interceptors remain in its stockpile.
WHY IRAN CHANGES THE CALCULATION
The key issue is not simply whether Israel can intercept another missile attack.
The bigger strategic question is how long Israel could maintain intensive interception operations if Iran continued launching ballistic missiles over an extended period.
Missile defence involves an economic and industrial contest as much as a technological one.
Interceptor missiles are sophisticated weapons that take significant time and resources to manufacture. An adversary may therefore attempt to place pressure on a defensive system by forcing it to repeatedly expend expensive interceptors.
Israel operates several layers of missile defence, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling and the Arrow system, but each is designed primarily for different types of threats and interception ranges.
Arrow is particularly important against long-range ballistic missiles, making its inventory a critical consideration during confrontation with Iran.
THE UNITED STATES FACES ITS OWN PRESSURE
Marom compared Israel’s situation with concerns facing the United States.
Reports throughout the conflict have raised questions about U.S. stocks of systems including THAAD and Patriot interceptors after significant numbers were deployed or fired across the Middle East.
That matters directly to Israel because American missile-defence support has become part of the wider defensive effort against Iranian ballistic missile attacks.
If American inventories become constrained, Washington may eventually face difficult decisions about how many interceptors can be committed to the Middle East while maintaining sufficient reserves for other potential conflicts and U.S. defence requirements.
THE BIG QUESTION
Israel still possesses one of the world’s most sophisticated multi-layered missile-defence networks, and there is no evidence that its defensive capability has simply disappeared.
However, Marom’s warning highlights a different vulnerability: sustainability.
A missile-defence system can be highly effective and still face difficulties if interceptor missiles are being consumed faster than industry can replace them.
That makes production capacity, stockpile size and continuing American assistance increasingly important if hostilities with Iran continue.
For Israel, the question may therefore no longer be simply whether its missile defences can stop incoming ballistic missiles.
It is whether those defences can continue doing so at the same intensity during a prolonged conflict.